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Abstract 
Paths into the Asian Crisis of 1997-98 and the recent global financial crisis were similar, but the 
roads out could not be more different.  Common wisdom has it that on impact Asia endured 
fiscal austerity imposed by the IMF whereas the IMF recommended stimulus in the case of the 
advanced nations at the epicenter of the crisis in 2008-09. While the IMF did recommend 
different policies to begin with, the fiscal adjustment in Asia was far more modest than is 
commonly known and the switch from stimulus to austerity in Europe was quite abrupt.  The 
difference in fiscal stance helps explain the difference in the post-crisis paths of output and 
employment in the two regions. 
                                                 
1 Prepared for the XIV Annual Jaques Polak Research Conference at the International Monetary Fund in honor of 
Stanley Fischer.  We thank Morris Goldstein for helpful comments. 
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Introduction 
When a country experiences a significant change in its macroeconomic circumstances, 
flexible policies can play a significant role in mitigating the impact of the shock on output, 
employment, and other key measures of economic performance (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1987, 
Ch. 12).  While there are generally a range of relevant policy options for leaders to consider in 
such scenarios, recent events in Europe and the United States have focused the collective 
imagination of the economics profession on the role of fiscal policy.  Specifically, in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, an acerbic debate has emerged over the issue of whether fiscal 
consolidation, colloquially known as “austerity,” has been helpful or harmful to the recovery of 
growth and employment in advanced economies.   
Conventional wisdom holds that fiscal expansion during a downturn can stimulate growth 
and return the economy to full employment, provided that debts are not so high as to preclude 
new borrowing.  In contrast to this view, a small but influential literature documents that 
austerity actually spurs economic expansion when countries reduce their cyclically adjusted 
primary balance (CAPB) through lower spending rather than higher taxes (Alesina and Perotti, 
1995; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010).  Given the extended slowdown in Europe following the onset 
of fiscal consolidation in 2010, however, and the relatively weak U.S. recovery in the aftermath 
of sequestration, the counter intuitive notion of expansionary austerity faces increasing 
skepticism.  Recent research at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports a negative 
relationship between fiscal consolidation forecasts and subsequent forecast errors of GDP growth 
(Blanchard and Leigh, 2013).  This evidence suggests that the IMF under-estimated the size of 
fiscal multipliers with respect to the fiscal consolidation programs that were announced in 
Europe in early 2010.  
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Despite mounting evidence in favor of Blanchard and Leigh, the austerity dispute 
remains unresolved in the academic community, and there is certainly no indication that the view 
of rapid fiscal consolidation as harmful to growth carries the day with policy makers in advanced 
countries (Jorda and Taylor, 2013).  Given the inconclusive state of the debate, it is surprising 
that both intellectual camps continue to direct their analytical machinery exclusively at episodes 
where countries pursue fiscal consolidation, ignoring the wealth of information inherent in 
comparing the economic performance of countries that pursue fiscal austerity with those that do 
not. 
In contrast to the previous literature on fiscal adjustment, this is precisely the approach 
we adopt in this paper.  Specifically, we exploit the similarities between the causes of the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997-98 and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09—and the differences in 
economic policy responses in each case—to provide a setting in which we can more definitively 
answer the following question.  Do countries that pursue countercyclical fiscal policy in response 
to a negative macroeconomic shock experience a faster recovery of output and employment than 
those that implement fiscal austerity? 
At the onset of the Asian Crisis, officials from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
urged national authorities to pursue fiscal consolidation as a means of stabilizing the balance of 
payments—improving the current account through a decrease in absorption. 2
                                                 
2 Citations to buttress the claim that the IMF insisted on fiscal austerity during the Asian Crisis.  Posen, Krugman, 
Frankel, Roach. Article IV consultation reports-various. 
  On the brink of 
losing capital market access and in desperate need of liquidity, Asian Crisis countries complied 
with the IMF’s conditions in order to receive emergency loans.  Shortly after the initial 
agreements were signed, however, the IMF reversed course with respect to its initial prescription 
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on fiscal consolidation, allowing countries to increase their deficits by enabling automatic 
stabilizers to take hold. 
The tack in Europe following the Global Financial Crisis was exactly the opposite.  
There, the IMF initially encouraged countries to pursue fiscal stimulus, starting in the fall of 
2008.3
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the economic consequences associated with the drastically 
different policy adjustments taken by Asian and European governments in response to the 
respective crises.  Figure 1, which plots the evolution, in event time, of the growth rate of GDP 
in affected countries before and after the East Asian and European crises, tells the central story 
that the rest of the paper explores in detail.  The two crises caused sharp economic contractions 
in both East Asia and in Europe.  But while the recovery in Asia was a rapid and robust “V”-
shaped affair, Europe is still struggling to mount a recovery, more of a “W”, as it were—less the 
final upstroke.   
  Two years later the European Commission and the European Central Bank (led by 
Germany) began to demand fiscal consolidation in return for contributing to the funding of 
emergency loans to Greece Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS).  Austerity measures were 
announced in 2010, budget deficits as a fraction of GDP were reduced and the European Fiscal 
Compact was announced in March 2011. 
In the countries hit by the East Asian Crisis—Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and 
Thailand—the average growth rate of GDP fell from an average of about 7 percent per year in 
the 4 years before the onset of the crisis to negative 9 percent upon impact.  A striking feature of 
the data is the speed with which growth recovered.  Within a year of the crisis, GDP growth 
turned positive.  The average growth rate of GDP during the four-year period after the crisis was 
                                                 
3 Text Documenting the IMF’Encouraging Fiscal Expansion Early in the Crisis 
http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/RITA_-_Background_Studies.pdf 
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about 5 percent—not quite back to the pre-crisis average but strong economic performance by 
most standards.   
The event-time profile of GDP growth in the five European Crisis countries stands in 
sharp contrast to their Asian counterparts.  Output falls on impact. The average growth rate of 
GDP in the five European Crisis countries, approximately 3 percent per year before the crisis, 
bottoms out at almost negative 5 percent in the first year after the crisis.  In the second year after 
the crisis, GDP growth becomes slightly less negative, but then begins to contract even more 
sharply in year 3, and falls to about negative 2.5 percent by year 4.  Output falls on impact; the 
recession deepens in the first year after the crisis hits, but the pace of contraction slows as fiscal 
stimulus begins to take effect.  But rather than growth continuing to recover as it did in East 
Asia, the GIIPs economies experience a “double dip.” It is interesting to note that the decline in 
growth accelerates about a year after the move to fiscal consolidation in Europe.  
Figure 2, which shows unemployment rates across the two regions in event time, tells a 
similar story of downturn and rapid recovery in Asia versus prolonged stagnation in Europe.  The 
average unemployment rate across the four East Asian countries in the four years prior to the 
crisis was about 3.5 percent.  The unemployment rate jumps above 5 percent in the year the crisis 
hits before falling to just under 4 percent in the fourth year after the crisis.  In contrast, the 
behavior of unemployment rates in the five European Crisis countries tells a consistent story of 
weakening economies that start to deteriorate even faster with the onset of austerity.  The 
average unemployment rate in the five European countries before the crisis was about 8 percent 
and jumps to 12 percent in the year after the crisis.  Mirroring the decrease in GDP growth 
shown in Figure 2, the rise in unemployment slows between the first and second year after the 
 5 
crisis (from 12 to 14 percent), before surging to about 18 percent in the fourth year following the 
crisis. 
Our formal statistical results indicate this simple visual story. Irrespective of the data 
series we choose, t-tests of means confirm that Asia tightened government finances early and 
then loosened as the need for countercyclical fiscal policy became clear. Europe began with 
fiscal stimulus but tightened and pursued fiscal consolidation before economic recovery took 
hold. Moreover, the differences in the changes in the fiscal policy stance explain the response of 
output across the two regions. Panel regression estimates with country-fixed effects corroborate 
that the change in fiscal stance from stimulus to austerity had a statistically significant impact on 
the decline in real GDP growth in Europe. The change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
has a negative and statistically significant impact on output growth when the fiscal stance 
switches from stimulus to austerity in Europe.  In East Asia, on the other hand, the 
contractionary impact of fiscal austerity is evident on impact during the crisis, but fiscal does not 
appear to have a statistically significant effect on real GDP growth policy in the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods.  Our findings are consistent with the argument that the size of the fiscal 
multiplier may depend on the state of the economy with significantly larger multipliers during 
recessions than in normal times (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012).   
The regression estimates also suggest that investment rates and growth rates in East Asia 
still remain below their pre-crisis levels.  There are at least two possible explanations for this 
finding.  One is that these countries have reached the limits of catch up growth and are settling 
into a new steady state characterized by investment and growth more akin to the advanced 
economy cohort of which they are now a part.  An alternative explanation is that despite the 
quick change of tack from fiscal consolidation to a stance that allowed the automatic stabilizers 
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to kick in, the Asian countries suffered permanent output losses.  Resolving which of these 
hypotheses is correct lies beyond the scope of this paper.  But if the Asian Crisis did result in 
permanent output losses in spite of attempts to use countercyclical fiscal policy (and other tools) 
as a means of adjustment to cushion the blow of financial crisis and recession then there is an 
important lesson here.  Deep economic contractions—especially those induced by financial 
crises—can have lasting effects.   
Beyond the specific contribution of advancing the debate on fiscal austerity, this paper 
contributes more broadly to a growing number of studies that demonstrate the power of 
comparative macro case studies to tell us about the impact of policy.  Using the narrative 
approach to identifying changes in fiscal policy popularized by Romer and Romer (1989, 2007), 
Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori (2011) demonstrate that in the short-run all consolidations lead to 
contraction. Henry and Miller (2009) demonstrate the power of the policy-experiment approach 
in an emerging economy context.  This paper uses the approach to illustrate the insights we can 
gain about advanced economies by using the narrative approach to compare the impact of policy 
changes in advanced economies with those in emerging markets.   
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I narrates the two tales of adjustment and 
documents the changes in fiscal policy stance in East Asia and Europe during and in the 
aftermath of the two crises. Section II describes the data and methods. Section III presents t-tests 
of means for debt and deficit variables as well as the absorption variables. Section IV describes 
the results from the formal estimations. Section V concludes. 
 
I. Two Tales of Adjustment 
Despite a few warning signs such as growing current account deficits, the Asian financial 
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crisis of 1997–1998 was largely unanticipated.  While some skeptics had argued that claims of 
the Asian economic miracle were overstated and that Asian economies would eventually run into 
diminishing returns (Krugman 1994; Young 1994, 1995), the complexity and severity of the 
crisis surprised most observers. Domestic asset markets collapsed, banks failed, and firms went 
bankrupt. Over-borrowing, insufficient regulatory oversight, large foreign-currency-denominated 
debt burdens, and collapsing exchange rates were seen as the main culprits that led to a vicious 
deleveraging cycle in which foreign investors lost confidence in East Asia, and net private 
capital flows declined dramatically both during and in the aftermath of the crisis. 
In the years prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, fiscal positions in the East Asian crisis 
countries were strong. Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia entered the crisis with fiscal surpluses 
(Figure 4). Although fiscal deficits in the crisis countries were moderate, the policy measures in 
the original IMF programs nevertheless included fiscal consolidation.  The fiscal adjustment was 
intended to help stem the reversal of international capital flows that had precipitated the crisis.  
The planned fiscal consolidation was strongest in Thailand, where the fiscal deficit had increased 
in the year prior to the crisis. In Indonesia and Korea, even the initial programs contained little 
overall adjustment and policy makers anticipated that expenditures would be cut elsewhere in the 
budget to cover the costs of recapitalizing banks (Lane et. al, 1999).  
As the crisis progressed, however, the collapse in domestic demand and deterioration in 
the real economy was far worse than anticipated. For instance, the original IMF forecast for real 
GDP growth of 3% for Indonesia in 1997 was subsequently revised to -12.1% and actually 
turned out to be -13.13% (Appendix Table 2, Panel A). Similarly, for Thailand the original 
forecast for 1998 was 3.5%, the estimate was revised to -5% and the realized GDP growth rate 
was -10.51% (Appendix Table 2, Panel C).  There was also a severe investment decline in the 
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crisis countries from 36% to 22% of GDP. 
As the deterioration in the economic situation became apparent, subsequent program 
reviews noted that the severity of the economic downturn was not anticipated in the original 
program targets.  Accordingly, the IMF adopted a new approach that was clearly articulated in 
April of 1998 by Stanley Fischer, then First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF: 
“On the question of the appropriate degree of fiscal tightening, the balance is a 
particularly fine one. At the outset of the crisis, countries needed to firm their 
fiscal positions, both to make room in their budgets for the future costs of 
financial restructuring, and --depending on the balance of payments situation -- 
to reduce the current account deficit… Among the three Asian crisis programs, 
the balance of payments factor was important only in Thailand, which had 
been running a current account deficit of about 8 percent of GDP.  
The amount of fiscal adjustment in Indonesia was one percent of GDP; 
in Korea it was 1.5 percent of GDP; and in Thailand -- reflecting its large 
current account deficit -- the initial adjustment was 3 percent of GDP. After 
these initial adjustments, if the economic situation in the country weakened 
more than expected, as it has in the three Asian crisis countries, the IMF has 
generally agreed with the country to let the deficit widen somewhat, that is, to 
let automatic stabilizers operate” (Fischer, 1998). 
 
In other words, the deteriorating economic environment had led to substantial increases 
in fiscal deficits, which, from the beginning of 1998 on, were accommodated by easing the 
programs' fiscal objectives (Lane et. al, 1999).  For instance, Appendix Table 2 shows that the 
original projections for the change in the fiscal balance for Indonesia in 1997/98 and 1998/99 
were -0.9% and 0.2% of GDP, respectively (Panel A). These targets were subsequently revised 
upward to -2.2% and -9.2% of GDP during the mid-year program reviews. The actual numbers 
for the change in the fiscal balance turned out to be -2.47% in 1997 and -1.04% in 1998. A 
similar pattern prevails for Korea and Thailand as well with the IMF fiscal targets being revised 
upwards in comparison with the projections made in the original programs (Panels B and C). 
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At the time the East Asian IMF programs were implemented, their goal was to use fiscal 
policy to facilitate external adjustment and bolster market confidence.  In hindsight, it is easy to 
say that the severity of the economic downturn was not accurately forecast in the original 
program formulations and that the IMF should have permitted greater fiscal flexibility from the 
outset.  Be that as it may, the Fund did loosen the fiscal straitjacket as the Asian Crisis unfolded 
and output recovered quickly.  These facts are at odds with the perception that the IMF applied a 
standard prescription of strict fiscal austerity during the East Asian crisis and suggest that the 
IMF adopted a far more accommodative fiscal stance in East Asia than is commonly known.  
The real question, therefore, is not whether the IMF got things right from the outset, but whether 
policy makers in Europe learned from the flexibility the Fund showed with respect to fiscal 
policy in Asia.   
 
I A. European Policy Responses to the Global Financial Crisis 
Much like the crisis that swept through Asia a decade earlier, the complexity and severity 
of the Global Financial Crisis cum Great Recession was also largely unanticipated.  Credit 
spreads spiked, housing prices and stock markets collapsed, bank failures were widespread, and 
firms went bankrupt. Only this time the crisis began in the developed world, which also bore the 
brunt of the impact. Over-borrowing and deregulation in financial markets led to a vicious 
deleveraging cycle from which the United States and Europe have yet to recover.  
Figure 3 demonstrates the evolution, in event time, of the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB) as a percentage of potential GDP in Asia and Europe (also referred to as the 
government’s structural fiscal balance).  The structural balance is widely-used as a measure of 
policy induced changes in fiscal policy as it filters out changes in fiscal balances that are due to 
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business cycle fluctuations. Figure 4 demonstrates the evolution, in event time, of the primary 
fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP in Asia and Europe.   
 Figure 3a and Figure 3b show that East Asia pursued a relatively neutral to expansionary 
fiscal policy stance in the midst and immediate aftermath of the crisis. The modest tightening 
about two years after the crisis coincides with the rapid recovery in real GDP growth followed by 
fiscal expansion during the 2001 recession. The primary fiscal balance starts off positive (about 
1.8 percent of GDP) in 1997 and begins to deteriorate mildly a year before the start of the crisis 
in 1997.  In the year the crisis hits, the average fiscal balance is about negative 1.8 percent of 
GDP.  One can see the impact of the qualitative story of changes in fiscal projections by the IMF 
within the year. GDP recovers and the fiscal balance improves for cyclical reasons.   
By contrast, the peripheral countries of Europe follow a markedly different approach to 
fiscal policy. Figure 3a shows that, on impact, structural balances expanded significantly in 2008 
and 2009 in the European periphery countries (GIIPS). The primary fiscal balance changed from 
-1.9% of GDP on average in 2007 to -5.5% in 2008 and -11.2% in 2009, an overall fiscal 
expansion of 3.6 percentage points of GDP between 2007/08 and 5.7 percentage points between 
2008/09 (Figure 3b). Figure 3 therefore shows that following the onset of the Global Financial 
Crisis the initial policy response was one of fiscal stimulus in line with textbook prescriptions of 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy adjustment.  Starting in 2010, however, the modus operandi in 
European economic policy switched from flexibility to austerity.  
The abrupt reversal in fiscal policy stance—especially in the European periphery—is 
striking in size, composition and speed even when compared to the initial fiscal adjustment path 
prescribed by the IMF in East Asia before Fund officials realized the depth and severity of the 
East Asian Crisis. For the European periphery, the primary fiscal balance changed from -13% of 
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GDP to -7.7% of GDP, a consolidation of 5.3 percentage points of GDP on average between 
2010 and 2011—almost twice as large as the adjustments initially prescribed in Thailand and 
three to five times as large as those in Korea and Indonesia.  In addition to the primary fiscal 
adjustments in Europe being larger than in Asia, they have also been more persistent—a further 
fiscal consolidation of approximately 1.6 percentage points of GDP took place in Europe 
between 2011 and 2012.  It is therefore important to note that whereas consolidation was never 
fully took implemented in Asia because of the IMF’s relatively quick change in course, fiscal 
consolidation in Europe took hold and persisted for more than two years in the midst of a severe 
downturn. 
Taken together, Figure 3a and Figure 3b paint a consistent picture of the change in fiscal 
policy stance in peripheral Europe relative to the East Asian crisis countries during and in the 
aftermath of the two crises. The central point that Asia and Europe took diametrically opposite 
approaches to fiscal policy is robust to the way in which one measures the level and changes in 
the fiscal stance.  Indeed, turning to the primary deficit, there is some evidence that the switch to 
countercyclical fiscal policy in Asia took place so quickly as to suggest the following 
characterization.  Asia, like Europe, pursued expansionary fiscal policy when the crisis hit (albeit 
modest).  The main difference is that once Asia began pursuing expansionary fiscal policy it 
stayed the course until economic activity rebounded.  One may argue that this was only one to 
two years since output rebounded so quickly. Europe changed tack in the third year after the 
crisis hit and this seems to have exacerbated the initial fall in output and increase in 
unemployment.  
 
IB. Alternative Channels of Adjustment 
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While the response of fiscal policy played a significant role in mitigating the impact of 
the Asian financial crisis on the real economy, it is important to remember that fiscal policy is 
just one of the tools available to policymakers confronted with a negative shock.  In addition to 
allowing automatic fiscal stabilizers such as the expansion of spending on the social safety net to 
kick in once the IMF recognized the importance of fiscal flexibility, the adjustment of prices—
specifically the exchange rate—played a central role in the rapid recovery of output in East Asia. 
Figure 4 demonstrates that the average crisis-stricken country in East Asia experienced a 23 
percent depreciation of the nominal exchange rate vis a vis the dollar during 1998 followed by an 
additional 10 percent over the course of the next three years.   
With a cumulative depreciation of over 30 percent against the dollar, the Asian crisis 
countries were able to quickly restore external balance.  In the three years before the onset of the 
crisis, current account balances in the Asian Crisis countries averaged about 5 percent of GDP.  
In Year 0 the crisis countries ran current account surpluses of almost 10 percent of GDP and the 
average current account balance over the course of the next three years was a surplus in excess of 
fiver percent of GDP.  Of course, the large depreciation of the nominal exchange rate was not a 
costless exercise.  The extensive short term dollar-denominated borrowing that in many ways 
precipitated the crisis meant that rapid depreciation led to financial distress for many 
corporations that did not have dollar revenues.  Nevertheless, the flexibility in prices played a 
significant role in allowing the economy to adjust through price adjustment and expenditure 
switching. 
In contrast, because the exchange rate has barely moved in Europe (Figure 4), the burden 
of adjustment in Europe has fallen on quantities rather than prices—expenditure reduction rather 
than expenditure switching.  There are of course many reasons why the Euro has not depreciated 
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against the dollar.  The exchange rate is not a policy instrument for Europe in the same way that 
it is for a small open economy. In the absence of the nominal exchange rate as a tool of 
adjustment, policy makers within the GIIPS are not without means to restore competitiveness.  
To the extent that policy makers cannot avail themselves of fiscal and monetary policy 
(exchange rate) to achieve internal and external balance, the remaining choices are to either push 
hard on structural reforms that raise the productivity of workers, or to accept internal 
devaluation.  
Between 2004 and 2009 average unit labor costs across the GIIPS rose over 16 percent.  
Indeed, from 2000 to 2009 unit labor costs in the GIIPS experienced a cumulative rise of 30 
percent.  With growth in wages outstripping growth in productivity by more than 3 percentage 
points per year, it is not surprising that the average current account deficit in the GIIPS reached 
almost 10 percent of GDP by 2008.  While unit labor costs have fallen by about 5 percent since 
2009, this is not nearly enough to undo the erosion of competitiveness that took place since the 
outset of the Euro.  Furthermore, the fall in unit labor costs has been almost exclusively the result 
of falling wages.  Average labor productivity in the GIIPS has been flat (see Figure 5). The 
question is whether falling wages alone can bear the brunt of adjustment.  This will take a long 
time and be very painful.  Structural reform holds out the promise of productivity increases, but 
so far there is little evidence of productivity gains or structural changes that would bring about 
more rapid productivity growth in the future.   
 
II. Data and Methodology 
The principal data sources used in this paper are the IMF's World Economic Outlook 
(Spring 2013) and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The WEO provides 
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numerous series related to output, government debt, deficits, savings and investment. Other 
absorption indicators such as household consumption, exports and imports and data for nominal 
variables like exchange rates and interest rates come from the IFS database. The primary country 
panel includes the four countries most hard hit by the East Asian crisis namely Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand and the peripheral countries of the original Euro zone4
For the European countries, the WEO includes a measure of the government structural 
balance also referred to as the cyclically-adjusted primary balance. Changes in the cyclically-
adjusted primary balance are used as a measure of changes in the government's discretionary 
balance or fiscal policy stance. For a number of the East Asian countries, coverage of this 
variable begins after 2000 following the East Asian crisis. Since the CAPB is a principal variable 
of interest for this paper, we constructed this measure for the East Asian countries following the 
methodology prescribed by Fedelino, Ivanova, and Horton (2009) in a technical note for the 
IMF. Briefly, the cyclically adjusted primary balance is: 
—Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS). The formal estimations also consider a wider Asian sample 
that includes China, India, Hong Kong, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan and the remaining 
(original) Euro zone countries of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. The sample also includes the United Kingdom. 
Appendix B presents the exact definitions of the variables used. The sample period is 1990-2012.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The original Euro zone refers to member countries that adopted the Euro before physical notes and coins were first 
introduced in January 2002. 
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The first term is the cyclically-adjusted component of government revenues where  is 
the nominal primary revenue,  is potential output,  is actual output and  is elasticity of 
revenue with respect to the output gap. The second term is the cyclically-adjusted component of 
government expenditures where  is the nominal government expenditure and is the 
elasticity of government expenditures with respect to the output gap.  
Fedelino, Ivanova, and Horton (2009) suggest that if revenue elasticity is equal to one 
(i.e., revenues are perfectly correlated with the cycle) and expenditure elasticity is equal to zero 
(i.e., expenditures are not affected by the cycle the cyclically adjusted primary balance becomes: 
 
 
Since measures of potential output of  were also missing from the WEO database, 
using the IMF's methodology, estimates of trend output were computed using a HP-filter with a 
smoothing parameter of 100. This measure of potential output was used to compute estimates of 
the output gap for the East Asian countries as well as the cyclically-adjusted primary balance as a 
percent of potential output (or GGSB_NPGDP in the WEO). 
 
III Simple Statistical Tests 
For each variable of interest, yit, where subscript i refers to the country and subscript t to 
the period, our approach is to examine the evolution of the variable from a pre-crisis baseline 
through the crisis and post-crisis periods across the different groups of countries—East Asia, the 
GIIPS, Asia-other and Europe-other. We address the challenge of unobserved heterogeneity at 
the individual or country-level by incorporating fixed effects into the econometric specifications. 
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However, it is not possible to control for calendar-time effects which are different across cohorts 
or in our case crises that occurred at two different points in calendar time. Since the East Asian 
crisis and the global financial crisis did not occur contemporaneously, we cannot directly employ 
a difference-in-difference methodology across Asia and Europe in our formal estimations to 
estimate the impact of say a change in fiscal stance on output growth.   
While the formal estimates have to be presented separately by group, this does not 
preclude simple t-tests of differences in means across cohorts or groups of countries in the same 
way that labor economists employ cohort-analysis to examine the determinants of the earning 
potential of cohorts that enter the labor force at different points in time.  For example, while we 
can present a simple t-test of means of a change in the government’s structural balance across 
East Asia and the GIIPS pre-crisis or post-crisis in event time, differences across East Asia and 
the GIIPS cannot be used to compute difference-in-difference estimates to compare the change in 
fiscal stance in the GIIPS between 2008-2012 with East Asia in 1998-2002 as the control group. 
 
IIIA. T-tests of Means: Debt and Deficits 
The t-tests of means are presented across time periods for each group and across groups 
within each time period. For example, t-tests for the change in the growth rate of real output 
between the pre-crisis and crisis periods or the crisis and post-crisis periods are presented for the 
GIIPS and East Asia separately in Table 1. Table 2 presents t-tests of means across groups for 
East Asia versus the GIIPS in the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods—all in event time. 
Table 1 shows the t-tests of means for debt and deficit variables by country group across 
four time periods. The first is a pre-crisis baseline period which begins four years prior to the 
crisis and ends one year before (T-4, T-1). The second is the crisis-period which is the year of the 
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crisis (T), the third is the immediate post-crisis period (T+1, T+2) and a second post-crisis phase 
three to four years out (T+3, T+4).5
For each variable, group means by time period were computed in two steps. First, a 
country-mean was calculated for each country and each of the four time periods. Second, the 
group mean was calculated by taking the mean across all countries in the group for each time 
period. For example, the first panel shows group averages for the general government gross debt 
as a percent of GDP for the four time periods. To obtain the group mean of 25.65 for the East 
Asian crisis countries in the pre-crisis period, a country mean was computed for each of the four 
crisis countries between 1994 and 1997. The group average was computed by taking an average 
of the four country averages. The same procedure was followed for all the variables in Table 1 
for each of the four time periods.   
 The post-crisis period is broken into two phases to capture 
the effects of the fiscal policy stance on impact and any change in fiscal policy stance as the 
crisis progresses. In particular examining the two post-crisis periods separately is designed to 
quantify the qualitative narrative of a change in fiscal stance from austerity on impact to stimulus 
as the real effects of the East Asian crisis began to unfold and the contrasting change in stance 
from fiscal stimulus on impact to austerity in 2010 for the GIIPS and Europe overall. 
The last three columns show t-tests of means for each group (by country) to examine 
whether the debt and deficit variables under consideration changed significantly (i) in the crisis 
period relative to the pre-crisis baseline, (ii) in the first phase post-crisis relative to the pre-crisis 
period, (iii) the second phase of the post-crisis period relative to the first phase. 
                                                 
5 Note that we take the crisis year to be 1998 for East Asia and 2008 for the global financial crisis. The four calendar 
time periods for the East Asian crisis are therefore 1994-1997(pre-crisis), 1998(crisis), 1999-2000(post-crisis I), 
2001-2002(post-crisis II). For the global financial crisis the time periods are 2004-2007 (pre-crisis), 2008 (crisis), 
2009-2010 (post-crisis I) and 2011-2012 (post-crisis II). 
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Panel 1 shows that while debt-to-GDP ratios rose for East Asia during and in the 
aftermath of the crisis, the changes across time periods were not statistically significant. It is 
noteworthy, however, that by 2002 East Asian debt-to-GDP ratios stood at about 48% of GDP 
relative to an average of 26% in the pre-crisis period. A similar pattern holds for the other Asian 
countries as well with the post-crisis build up in the debt-to-GDP ratio being statistically 
significant. For the peripheral countries of Europe (the GIIPS) in contrast the increase in debt-to-
GDP ratios post-crisis has been strikingly large and statistically significant. It is worth noticing 
that the pre-crisis average debt-to-GDP ratio for the GIIPS stood at about 68% while violating 
the Maastricht criterion of 60% is nowhere close to the 120% average between 2011-2012 (Post-
Crisis II). The European core also experienced an increase in debt-to-GDP ratios, however, not 
as significantly large as the European periphery. Later in the paper we disentangle the sources of 
the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratios for the GIIPS to examine the contribution of rising interest 
rates, falling growth and changes in fiscal deficits. 
Several measures of fiscal policy illustrate the differences in fiscal policy between the 
GIIPS and the East Asian countries.  Panel 2 shows the government's fiscal balance as a percent 
of GDP which is inclusive of interest payments. The t-tests suggest that for the East Asian 
countries, a steady overall stimulus was applied throughout the crisis and post-crisis periods. 
While the IMF prescribed austerity measures initially, the policy was quickly reversed as 
Appendix Table B shows. Since the policy reversal takes place within the crisis year, and the 
WEO data simply show the final numbers which suggest an expansion in the fiscal balance--
initially by drawing down the pre-crisis budgetary surplus and then by incurring deficits. A 
similar pattern is seen in the other East Asian countries as well.  
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The Post II- Post I column tells a compelling story in the difference between the 
evolution of the fiscal deficit in East Asia versus Europe. In years 3 and 4 after the crisis, the 
average overall fiscal balance as a fraction of GDP in Asia becomes 1.82 percentage points more 
negative and is significant at the 10 percent level of confidence.  The average GIIPS country on 
the other hand experiences a 6.15 percentage point fiscal consolidation that is significant at the 5 
percent level.  The average core European country also experiences a fiscal tightening in the 
third and fourth years after the crisis of 1.26 percentage points of GDP that is significant at the 5 
percent confidence level.    
Panel 3 shows the primary fiscal balance exclusive of net interest payments which 
reflects a similar pattern of stimulus or fiscal expansion in East Asia and stimulus followed by 
austerity in Europe with the magnitude of the adjustment being much larger for the GIIPS 
relative to the European core. 
Row 1 of Panel 4 demonstrates that In East Asia, the CAPB rises from 0.16 percent of 
potential GDP before the crisis to 0.57 percent reflecting a mild but statistically insignificant 
tightening of 0.41 percentage points. This observation is also consistent with our basic assertion 
that the fiscal consolidation imposed by the IMF was not particularly stringent.  The increases in 
the CAPB in the Post I and Post II periods are even smaller, 0.14 and 0.05 percentage points. For 
the other Asian countries there was a very small discretionary stimulus suggesting that across 
Asia the discretionary fiscal policy stance was almost neutral during and in the aftermath of the 
crisis.  
We see a very different pattern of the CAPB in Europe.  Prior to the great recession, the 
average CAPB in the GIIPs was negative 4.72 percent of potential GDP.  On impact, the average 
deficit widens to negative 7.93 percent of potential GDP, a fiscal loosening of 3.21 percentage 
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points that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  In the first two years after the crisis, 
the CAPB becomes slightly more negative and bottoms out at an average of negative 9.26 
percent of potential GDP.  Things turn radically in 2010 following the adoption of austerity 
measures that were part of the conditions imposed by the IMF/EU loan programs.  In the third 
and fourth year after the crisis, fiscal policy tightens significantly as the CAPB goes from 
negative 9.26 percent of GDP to negative 5.42 percent of potential GDP, a fiscal tightening of 
3.84 percentage points of potential GDP that is significant at the 5 percent level.  The core 
European countries demonstrate a similar pattern.  The average CAPB becomes 1.76 percentage 
points more negative in the first two years after the crisis; this is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.  In the third and fourth years after the crisis, the CAPB becomes less negative by 
0.87 percentage points of potential GDP, a fiscal tightening that is significant at the 5 percent 
confidence level. 
Panels 5 and 6 decompose the government's net borrowing and lending into revenues and 
expenditures, respectively. The t-tests show that while government revenues fell during the East 
Asian crisis they had increased significantly by 2002 for the crisis countries and fallen although 
not statistically significantly for the other East Asian countries. For the GIIPS, revenues fell in 
the initial aftermath of the crisis but rose by on average 1.48% of GDP. For the European core, 
revenues as a fraction of GDP appear to have remained remarkably stable. Panel 6 shows that the 
bulk of the adjustment in the fiscal balance for the GIIPS following 2010 has been in the form of 
government expenditure cuts. Government expenditures rose by 3.3% during the crisis year and 
by a further 5.6% in the two years following the crisis and then fell by 3.72% after 2010. The fall 
in expenditures (3.72%) and rise in revenues (1.48%) accounts for the 5.2% consolidation in the 
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fiscal balance for the GIIPS in Panel 3. T-tests show a similar pattern of rising government 
expenditures to a cut following 2010 for the core European countries. 
Table 2 presents t-tests of means for the GIIPS relative to East Asia in event time. These 
statistics therefore represent cross-group comparisons of means by time period.  The t-test how 
that in event time difference in debt-to-GDP ratio for the GIIPS relative to East Asia changes 
significantly from Post-Crisis I to Post Crisis II. The fiscal stimulus in the immediate aftermath 
of the crisis is significantly different to the East Asian crisis countries at the 1% significance 
level. The reversal in fiscal position in the GIIPS relative to East Asia from stimulus to austerity 
in the last three columns is also highly statistically significant in event time.  
Notice that the last three columns represent changes across groups across event-time 
periods and are therefore a “surrogate difference in difference” estimate of the changes that take 
place in the GIIPS relative to the East Asian crisis countries across event-time. We refer to these 
as surrogate estimates since the event time periods for the two groups do not coincide in calendar 
time—the East Asian crisis took place in 1998 and the global financial crisis in 2008. Therefore 
the East Asian crisis countries cannot be used as a control group in a strict or formal difference in 
difference sense. However, it is legitimate to present t-test of means as a simple statistical 
comparison across country-groups and as is often done in the labor-literature to make cross-
cohort statistical comparisons. We discuss this issue in greater detail when we present the formal 
estimations. 
The general government overall balance in the GIIPS relative to East Asia shows a 
statistically significant fiscal stimulus in the GIIPS in the crisis and the first post-crisis period. 
After 2010, however, the fiscal stimulus changes to a highly statistically significant fiscal 
consolidation of 7.97% of GDP relative to East Asia and relative to the immediate aftermath of 
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the crisis. A similar and statistically significant pattern of changes is seen in the t-tests of means 
for the government's primary fiscal balance, structural balance, government revenues and 
expenditures.  
The patterns in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that not only are the within group changes 
significant across time for the GIIPS as a group, the reversal in fiscal stance is also highly 
significant across groups, i.e., relative to the East Asia crisis countries as a group in event time. 
In particular, note the highly significant reversals in sign in the last two columns of Table 2 for 
all the government fiscal balance variables. For example, government expenditures in the GIIPS 
increase dramatically relative to East Asia and then fall equally dramatically--the difference in 
the government expenditure ratio across the two regions changes from a positive 5.72% of GDP 
(in the penultimate column of Table 2) to a negative 5.78% of GDP (the last column of Table 2.  
The bottom line is that irrespective of the data series we choose the story remains the 
same.  Asia tightened government finances early and then loosened as the need for 
countercyclical fiscal policy became clear. Europe began with fiscal stimulus but tightened and 
pursued fiscal consolidation before economic recovery took hold. 
 
III B.  T-Tests of Means: Real GDP Growth and Absorption Indicators 
Table 3 confirms the statistical and economic significance of Figure 3.  The average 
growth rate of GDP falls by 16.56 percentage points during the Asian Crisis but growth rebounds 
quickly.  The column labeled (Post I- Crisis) demonstrates that GDP growth two years after the 
crisis is 15.25 percentage points higher than during the crisis.  A simple t-test of means shows 
that this difference is statistically significant at the 1 % level of confidence.  
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Turning to the GIIPS we see the opposite pattern.  The average pre-crisis growth rate in 
the GIIPs was 3.17 percent.  During the crisis the average growth rate falls to -0.51 percent. 
Unlike Asia, however, growth does not begin to recover in the two years after the crisis.  The 
contraction actually gets worse.  The average growth rate in the GIIPS in the two years after the 
crisis is -2.23 percent.  The Post I-Crisis column indicates that the 3.68 percentage point decline 
in growth is statistically significant at a 5 percent level of confidence.  Growth remains negative 
in the third and fourth year after the crisis, averaging negative 1.88 percent. For the core 
countries of Europe, the change in average growth rates (Post II-Post I) is positive and 
significant. 
Turning to unemployment reveals a similar pattern.  At the onset of the Asian Crisis 
unemployment jumped from an average of 3.09 percent to 5.12 percent, an increase that is 
significant at a 10 percent level of confidence.  There is no significant increase in the 
unemployment rate in the Asian Crisis countries in the two years after the crisis.  Prior to the 
crisis, the average unemployment rate in the GIIPs was 7.54 percent.  On impact, the GIIPs 
unemployment rate rises slightly to 7.93 percent but the increase is not statistically significant.  
Things change dramatically, however, in the Post-Crisis I period where the average 
unemployment rate jumps to 12.19 percent—an increase of 4.25 percentage points that is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level.  The unemployment rate rises by 
another 4.22 percentage points to an average of 16.41 percent in the Post-Crisis II period.  This 
increase is also significant at the 5 percent confidence level. 
Investment ratios also fell and recovered in East Asia following the crisis while 
investment ratios continue to fall significantly in the post-crisis period for the peripheral 
countries of Europe. Consistent with a continuing decline in domestic absorption, current 
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account deficits in the GIIPS in the pre-crisis and crisis period have shrunk in a statistically 
significant manner in the post-crisis period.  
Table 4 shows that the East Asian crisis countries grew faster by 4.2% on average relative 
to the GIIPS in the pre-crisis period in event time. The collapse of growth on impact during the 
crisis in East Asia was far more drastic and statistically significant relative the GIIPS (a fall of 
8.7%). Combined with the evidence in the first column that these countries were growing faster 
than the GIIPS by about 4.2 percent, on average, the fall of 8.7% on average during the crisis 
represents a change of approximately 12.9% in the gap in growth rates relative to the pre-crisis 
period. By the same token, the recovery in East Asia was also very fast and significantly higher, 
8.29% on average, relative to the GIIPS in two years after crisis. The difference in the growth 
rates in the second phase of the crisis in the GIIPS relative to East Asia narrows a bit in event 
time due to the world recession in 2001 (t+3 in event time for East Asia).     
 Table 4 shows that the unemployment rate was significantly higher in the GIIPS relative 
to East Asia in pre-crisis period in event time. The increase in unemployment on impact during 
crisis in GIIPS was lower relative to East Asia and average gap relative to Asia narrows relative 
to the average gap in the pre-crisis period. The increase in unemployment in post-crisis period, 
however, is significantly higher (7.44%) and the average unemployment gap relative to East Asia 
increases by 4.6%. Unemployment continues to rise to on average 11.7% higher than East Asia 
in the second post-crisis period and the change relative to first post-crisis period is also 
significantly higher--the average gap in unemployment in the GIIPS increases by a further 4.3% 
relative to East Asia in event time. The changes in the average gap in unemployment across the 
different phases of the crisis are highly statistically significant. 
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Consumption ratios are higher in GIIPS relative to East Asia in pre-crisis period. The gap 
widens significantly on impact during crisis and then narrows significantly in the post-crisis 
period. Turning to investment, investment ratios were significantly higher in East Asia in pre-
crisis period by on average 12.5%. The collapse in investment ratios on impact was very 
dramatic during crisis relative to the GIIPS such that gap between investment ratios across the 
two regions in event time changes by 14.16% with investment ratios in GIIPS higher by 1.64% 
on average relative to East Asia. The trend in gaps reverses dramatically in post-crisis period 
with investment in Asia recovering and in the GIIPS collapsing such that the gap is 6% and 4.4% 
higher in East Asia relative to the GIIPS in the two phases of the post-crisis period. The changes 
in the investment ratio gaps are statistically significant. Note that the gap between investment 
ratios in East Asia and the GIIPS does not return to pre-crisis levels suggesting that East Asian 
investment ratios do not recover to pre-crisis levels. We explore this finding further in the formal 
estimations. 
 Savings ratios were higher in East Asia relative to GIIPS in pre-crisis period. The gap 
widens on impact during crisis suggesting that the fall in savings ratios is higher in the GIIPS 
relative to East Asia on impact during the crisis. The Gap in savings ratios narrows a little in the 
post-crisis period and remains wider than the pre-crisis period. Finally, current account deficits 
were higher in the GIIPS, on average, relative to East Asia in the pre-crisis period. The gap in 
current account balances widens on impact with deficits growing larger in the GIIPS and current 
account surpluses in East Asia. This trend reverses in the post-crisis period with deficits falling 
dramatically in the GIIPS while East Asia maintains small surpluses on the current account. 
 
IV. Formal Estimations 
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The formal estimations employ a fixed effects panel specification as follows: 
 
 
 
Where  is output growth or the unemployment rate or the output gap in period t.   
estimates the impact of a change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance lagged one period. 
 controls for a one-period lag of the dependent variable and  measures the impact of various 
lagged control variables designed to control for initial conditions such as the debt-to-gdp ratio, 
the balance on the current account, the level of the fiscal balance, exchange rates and interest 
rates.  represents the country-fixed effects and  is the error term. The specifications are 
estimated for each group of countries separately and for four different event-time periods around 
the crisis episodes.  
We use these formal estimations to examine whether the qualitative story shown 
graphically and via t-tests of means are borne out in the formal estimations. The patterns are 
striking. Panels a-c of Table 5 present group-wise regressions for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-
crisis periods. Beginning with the first set of results for the European countries, Column 1a 
shows that the lagged structural balance is positively correlated with real GDP growth in the pre-
crisis period. However, Column 2a controls for lagged real GDP growth, we see that the period 
of consolidation is associated with a period of positive and significant real GDP growth. In other 
words, the results in Column 2a are consistent with a countercyclical fiscal policy stance.  
During the crisis period, 2008-2009, the coefficient on the lagged structural balance in 
Column 3a remains positive and statistically significant but once a control for lagged GDP 
growth is included the coefficient loses significant (Column 4a). In Column 5a we see a negative 
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and highly significant coefficient on the change in the lagged structural balance. The coefficient 
suggests that the change in fiscal stance from stimulus to austerity had a statistically significant 
impact on the decline in real GDP growth in Europe. Moreover, the sign and statistical 
significance of this variable remain robust to the inclusion of lagged real GDP growth as a 
control. A similar pattern obtains for the peripheral countries of Europe in panel B. Note that the 
number of observations comes from just five countries and therefore the robustness of the result 
varies when real GDP growth in included as a control.  
Turning to East Asia in Panel C, we see that the contractionary impact of fiscal austerity 
is evident on impact during the crisis. However in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods the effect 
of discretionary fiscal policy does not appear statistically significant. Note that these regressions 
include all ten Asian countries in the sample. Insufficient numbers of observations precluded a 
similar regression exercise limited to the four East Asian countries most badly affected by the 
Asian crisis. The results in Panels a-c of Table 5 confirm the simple visual story in Figures 1-4 
corroborated by the t-tests of means. 
Our findings are consistent with the argument that the size of the fiscal multiplier may 
depend on the state of the economy with significantly larger multipliers during recessions than in 
normal times (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012).  Factors that could drive the state-dependent 
size of the fiscal multiplier include: the prevalence of a zero lower bound that precludes further 
monetary easing to counteract fiscal austerity measures; and the response of consumption and 
investment to current rather than future income and profits. In the face of contracting aggregate 
demand on the consumption and investment front, fiscal austerity measures can have a 
significantly higher impact on output. 
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Table 6 shows that a cross-country growth regressions using panel data for the East Asian 
crisis countries (1980-2012). The regression specification includes country fixed effects. The 
first column shows that, on average, real GDP growth is lower by 2.6% when a post-crisis 
dummy is included in the growth regression. For the pre-crisis period, the average growth rate of 
real GDP is on average 7.3% and the average post-crisis growth rate is 4.7% in the four countries 
that experienced the brunt of the East Asian crisis. The evidence therefore suggests that while the 
crisis-afflicted economies recovered quickly real GDP growth did not return to the pre-crisis 
average. Column (2) shows that on average post-crisis investment ratios are about 8.9% lower 
that the pre-crisis average of approximately 35% of GDP. The data suggest that investment ratios 
also did not recover to their pre-crisis levels. Taken together the evidence in Column (1) and (2) 
suggests that both real GDP growth and investment ratios are significantly lower in the East 
Asian crisis countries.  
Disentangling whether the decline in growth and investment represents a new steady state 
for the East Asian countries due to convergence and declining marginal returns a la Krugman 
(1994) and Young (1994, 1995) or a permanent loss in output lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, in Column (3) a simple regression of real GDP growth on investment ratios suggests 
that for the full sample of data, a 1% increase in the investment-GDP ratio leads to a 0.26% 
increase in real GDP growth. Column (5) shows that in the pre-crisis period a 1% increase in the 
investment ratio led to a 0.1% increase in real GDP growth while in Column (6) a 1% increase in 
the investment ratio leads to a 0.27% increase in real GDP growth. The evidence in Columns 5 
and 6 is possible evidence of a higher marginal product of capital or a more efficient use of 
capital following the crisis. 
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The evidence in Table 6 suggests that investment rates and growth rates in East Asia still 
remain below their pre-crisis levels.  There are at least two possible explanations for this 
observation.  One is that these countries have reached the limits of catch up growth and are 
settling into a new steady state characterized by investment and growth more akin to the 
advanced economy cohort of which they are now a part.  An alternative explanation is that 
despite the quick change of tack from fiscal consolidation to a stance that allowed the automatic 
stabilizers to kick in, the Asian countries suffered permanent output losses.  Resolving which of 
these hypotheses is correct lies beyond the scope of this paper.  But if the Asian Crisis did result 
in permanent output losses in spite of attempts to use countercyclical fiscal policy (and other 
tools) as a tool of adjustment to cushion the blow of financial crisis and recession then there may 
be an important additional lesson here.  Deep economic contractions—especially those caused by 
financial crises—can have lasting effects.  Policy makers would be wise to use all tools at their 
disposal—including fiscal policy—to avoid them, even if it means running larger deficits than 
they would like in the short to medium term.  
 
V. Conclusion 
A re-examination of the Asian Crisis in light of the slow recovery in Europe following 
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis reveals the limitations of the “It’s mostly fiscal” 
characterization of the IMF as a wholesale purveyor of austerity.  While the Fund initially 
pushed for fiscal consolidation during the Asian Crisis, officials in the organization moved to a 
more accommodative stance within a year. The story of adjustment in Europe is exactly the 
opposite.  Europe began with an accommodative stance that turned to fiscal austerity two years 
later. Furthermore, the size of the initial adjustments in Asia pale in comparison with the size of 
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the fiscal consolidation imposed on the GIIPS by the EC, ECB, and the IMF during their 
emergency loan agreements. In the European Story, moreover, the Fund has been the voice of 
moderation, pushing for fiscal measures rather than targets such as those required under the 
European Fiscal Compact. 
While there are many possible explanations for why Asia’s recovery from its crisis has 
been more rapid and robust than that of Europe, a leading candidate is the decision by policy 
makers in the two regions to adopt very different adjustment strategies. In one case there was 
initial fiscal consolidation followed by greater flexibility to allow for automatic stabilizers.  In 
the other case there was initial fiscal expansion with a quick pivot to fiscal consolidation. The 
impact of this quick pivot on output and employment may have been exacerbated by the absence 
of other policy levers such as exchange rate flexibility and monetary policy independence. 
That said, the data behave in a manner that would seem to reflect the theory of 
countercyclical fiscal policy at work: by running surpluses when times are good governments 
can accumulate a stockpile of funding that allows them to spend, stimulate aggregate demand 
and cushion the blow when the economy is hit with a negative shock.  The initial contraction in 
Asia came about as fiscal policy tightened.  Output and employment rebounded as policy became 
more expansionary.  The moderated fiscal stance in Asia plus the commitment to reform was the 
key to the quick recovery.6
It is also worthwhile noting that the IMF’s emphasis on structural reforms in Europe has 
been less aggressive than its stance on reforms in Asia. The reforms that were formally part of 
 Expansionary policy in Europe in the early days of the financial crisis 
helped mitigate the real economic impact.  The switch to fiscal consolidation seems to have 
contributed to the onset of a double dip.  
                                                 
6 Summary of structural reforms during Asian Crisis on page 21: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp98128.pdf 
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the agreements in Europe appear to have been less deep and extensive, particularly those 
addressing critical bottlenecks such as product market, labor market and banking sector reforms.7
When financial markets lose confidence in the policies of a nation, it may have no choice 
but to embrace tough measures—including fiscal austerity—to regain access to international 
capital markets and put public finances back on a sustainable trajectory. While the long-run 
benefits of austerity may outweigh the short-run costs for a small country that is cut off from 
world capital markets, this may not be the case for a set of large, systemically important 
countries such as the European Union or.  In this context, the circumstances under which the 
benefits of austerity outweigh the costs, and the optimal speed of fiscal adjustment are not 
absolute.. While cold-turkey deficit reduction may be the optimal strategy for balancing the 
budget in some circumstances, on other occasions a gradual path toward eliminating the deficit 
may actually constitute the disciplined course of action.   Indeed, the facts uncovered in this 
paper suggest that discipline in the GIIPS does not mean fiscal austerity but rather a commitment 
to countercyclical fiscal policy coupled with an unwavering commitment to structural reforms 
that have the capacity to increase productivity.  
 
                                                 
7 An IMF review of the progress to date under the new Greek program noted that Greece’s fiscal and external 
imbalances are improving, but its substantial economic contraction has continued. The IMF found that the structural 
transformation of economy is proceeding at a slow place outside of the labor market, “…and this is making Greece’s 
adjustment more costly.” There was agreement with the Greek authorities that “…structural reforms to date had 
been uneven at best, and that a reinvigoration of the reform agenda would be critical to boost potential growth.”  
The review cited a lack of movement in deregulating product markets by removing barriers to entry. The 
privatization of state-owned assets was another area of major concern, since the targets that had been set “…have 
been missed by a wide margin”, in part because of political resistance. The IMF acknowledged that the reform of 
Greek labor markets had been initiated, but called for further measures, such as the implementation of a new 
minimum wage system. The liberalization of entry to regulated professions also needed to be advanced. 
A recent IMF review of Portugal’s record in the program found that structural reforms have been advanced, and 
gave these efforts some of the credit for the decline in Portuguese government bond yields. The government has 
moved to tackle excessive regulatory procedures, and adapt wage bargaining to allow differences in wages across 
sectors. A number of judicial reforms are also underway. But the IMF’s staff worried that “…it remains unclear 
whether reforms to date are sufficient to address the large external competitiveness gap or will engender an 
adequately strong supply response to avoid a prolonged demand-driven slump. 
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Figure 1. Policy Makers in Asia and Europe adopted very different approaches to fiscal policy 
following their financial crises. 
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Figure 1a: Primary Fiscal Balance in Event Time
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Figure 1b: Change in Cyclically Adjusted (Structural) Balance
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Figure 2. Growth in Asia following the Asian financial crisis rebounds more quickly than growth 
in the European Periphery countries following the 2008 Financial Crisis 
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Figure 2: Real GDP Growth
 
 
Figure 3. Unemployment in Asia following the Asian financial crisis rises less rapidly than it 
does in the European Periphery countries following the 2008 Financial Crisis 
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 Figure 4: 
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Figure 4: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate Index
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Averages Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II
(t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4) Crisis-Pre
Post I-
Crisis
Post II-
Post I
East Asian Crisis 25.65 33.96 51.62 47.78 8.32 17.66 -3.85
GIIPS 67.82 74.92 95.68 119.35 7.10* 20.75*** 23.67***
East Asia-other 46.21 47.35 50.22 51.92 1.14 2.87* 1.70***
Europe-core 51.2 52.68 60.39 64.74 1.48 7.71*** 4.35***
Averages Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II
(t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4) Crisis-Pre
Post I-
Crisis
Post II-
Post I
East Asian Crisis 4.09 2.04 -1.15 -2.97 -2.05 -3.19 -1.82*
GIIPS 0.63 -2.58 -8.88 -2.73 -3.21* -6.30** 6.15**
East Asia-other 3.97 -0.44 1.2 -0.51 -4.41 1.64 -1.70*
Europe-core 1.29 1.37 -2.98 -1.72 0.08 -4.35*** 1.26***
Averages Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II
(t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4) Crisis-Pre
Post I-
Crisis
Post II-
Post I
East Asian Crisis 1.56 -1.88 -1.84 -1.84 -3.44** 0.04 0
GIIPS -2.3 -5.55 -12.14 -6.94 -3.26* -6.58** 5.20**
East Asia-other -0.12 -3.01 -2.22 -4.04 -2.89* 0.79 -1.81**
Europe-core -0.09 0.26 -4.23 -2.99 0.35 -4.49*** 1.24***
Table 1: T-Tests of Means: Debt and Deficits 
Changes
Changes
Changes
By Country-Group in Crisis Event Time
Panel 1: General government gross debt (% of GDP)
Panel 2: General government primary lending/borrowing (% of GDP)
Panel 3: General government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)
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Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II
(t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4) Crisis-Pre
Post I-
Crisis
Post II-
Post I
East Asian Crisis 0.16 0.57 0.71 0.76 0.41 0.14 0.05
GIIPS -4.72 -7.93 -9.26 -5.42 -3.21* -1.33 3.84**
East Asia-other -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05*** 0 -0.02**
Europe-core -0.61 -0.84 -2.59 -1.72 -0.23 -1.76*** 0.87**
Averages Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II
(t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4) Crisis-Pre
Post I-
Crisis
Post II-
Post I
East Asian Crisis 20.73 19.27 19.16 21.23 -1.46 -0.11 2.07**
GIIPS 39.97 40.02 39.01 40.49 0.05 -1.01** 1.48**
East Asia-other 20.63 19.19 19.19 17.96 -1.44* 0 -1.24
Europe-core 47.56 47.51 47.2 47.48 -0.05 -0.31 0.28
Averages Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II
(t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4) Crisis-Pre
Post I-
Crisis
Post II-
Post I
East Asian Crisis 19.17 21.15 21 23.06 1.97 -0.15 2.06*
GIIPS 42.27 45.57 51.15 47.43 3.30* 5.57* -3.72*
East Asia-other 20.75 22.2 21.42 21.99 1.45* -0.78 0.58
Europe-core 47.65 47.26 51.43 50.47 -0.4 4.17*** -0.96***
Changes
Changes
Changes
Panel 4: Government Structural Balance (% of Potential GDP)
Panel 5: General Government Revenues (% of GDP)
Panel 6: General Government Expenditure (% of GDP)
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 Pre-Crisis Crisis
Post-
Crisis I
Post-
Crisis II  
 (t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4)  Crisis-Pre
Post I-
Crisis
Post II-
Post I
 
General government gross debt 
(% of GDP) 42.17 40.96 44.05 71.57 -1.21 3.09 27.52***
General government primary 
lending/borrowing (% of GDP) -3.46 -4.62 -7.72 0.25 -1.15 -3.10* 7.97***
General government net 
lending/borrowing (% of GDP) -3.86 -3.68 -10.30 -5.10 0.18 -6.62** 5.20**
Government Structural Balance 
(% of Potential GDP) -4.88 -8.50 -9.97 -6.18 -3.62** -1.47 3.78**
General Government Revenues 
(% of GDP) 19.24 20.75 19.85 19.27 1.51* -0.90** -0.58
General Government 
Expenditure (% of GDP) 23.10 24.43 30.15 24.37  1.33 5.72** -5.78**
Changes
Average Difference (GIIPS-East Asia)
Table 2: T-Tests of Means: Debt and Deficits
GIIPS versus East Asia in Crisis Event Time
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Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II  
 (t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4)  Crisis-Pre Post I-Crisis Post II-Post I
East Asian Crisis 7.38 -9.18 6.07 4.08 -16.56*** 15.25*** -1.99
GIIPS 3.17 -0.51 -2.23 -1.88 -3.68** -1.72** 0.35
East Asia-other 6.90 1.42 6.14 3.45 -5.49** 4.72** -2.69**
Europe-core 3.18 0.35 -1.02 1.17  -2.83*** -1.36*** 2.19***
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II  
 (t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4)  Crisis-Pre Post I-Crisis Post II-Post I
East Asian Crisis 3.09 5.12 4.75 4.67 2.03* -0.37 -0.08
GIIPS 7.54 7.93 12.19 16.41 0.39 4.25** 4.22**
East Asia-other 3.67 4.61 4.97 5.85 0.94** 0.36** 0.88**
Europe-core 6.57 5.52 7.08 6.69  -1.04*** 1.56*** -0.39*
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II  
 (t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4)  Crisis-Pre Post I-Crisis Post II-Post I
East Asian Crisis 53.27 53.45 55.08 56.13 0.18 1.62* 1.06
GIIPS 59.44 61.22 60.99 61.13 1.78 -0.24 0.14
East Asia-other 55.95 56.78 56.93 58.01 0.84 0.15 1.08
Europe-core 51.31 50.36 51.8 51.58  -0.95** 1.44*** -0.22
Changes
Table 3: T-Tests of Means: Absorption Indicators
By Country-Group in Event Time
Real GDP Growth (%)
Unemployment Rate (% )
Consumption Ratio (% of GDP)
Averages
Averages
Averages
Changes
Changes
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Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II  
 (t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4)  Crisis-Pre Post I-Crisis Post II-Post I
East Asian Crisis 37.47 22.24 23.21 24.92 -15.23*** 0.97 1.72
GIIPS 24.95 23.88 18.68 16.00 -1.07 -5.20*** -2.68***
East Asia-other 30.88 28.23 27.24 25.43 -2.65*** -0.99 -1.81
Europe-core 20.34 21.09 18.12 19.35  0.76** -2.98*** 1.23***
 
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II  
 (t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4)  Crisis-Pre Post I-Crisis Post II-Post I
East Asian Crisis 33.28 32.69 30.63 29.32 -0.60 -2.05** -1.31
GIIPS 18.58 14.72 12.90 12.82 -3.86 -1.83*** -0.08***
East Asia-other 32.26 33.02 30.47 30.18 0.76 -2.55 -0.29
Europe-core 24.52 24.12 21.21 22.30  -0.4 -2.91*** 1.09**
Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis I Post-Crisis II  
 (t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4)  Crisis-Pre Post I-Crisis Post II-Post I
East Asian Crisis -0.72 0.92 0.88 0.54 1.64 -0.04** -0.34
GIIPS -8.20 -13.48 -7.94 -4.36 -5.28*** 5.54*** 3.58**
East Asia-other 1.72 2.28 1.51 1.42 0.56 -0.77 -0.09
Europe-core 4.00 2.90 2.80 2.35  -1.1 -0.1 -0.45
Changes
Changes
Changes
Averages
Investment Ratio (% of GDP)
National Gross Savings Rate (% of GDP )
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)
Averages
Averages
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Pre-Crisis Crisis
Post-
Crisis I
Post-
Crisis II
(t-4, t-1) (t=0) (t+1, t+2) (t+3,t+4) Crisis-Pre
Post I-
Crisis
Post II-
Post I
Real GDP Growth            
(percent) -4.21 8.67 -8.29 -5.96 12.88*** -16.96*** 2.33*
Unemeployment Rate 
(percent ) 4.45 2.81 7.44 11.74 -1.64** 4.63*** 4.30**
Consumption Ratio       
(% of GDP) 6.17 7.77 5.91 4.99 1.60* -1.86*** -0.92**
Investment Ratio           
(% of GDP) -12.52 1.64 -4.53 -8.92 14.16*** -6.17*** -4.39***
Gross Savings Rate                                
(% of GDP ) -14.70 -17.96 -17.73 -16.51 -3.26** 0.23 1.23*
Current Account 
Balance (% of GDP) -7.48 -14.40 -8.82 -4.90 -6.92*** 5.58*** 3.92**
Difference in Difference
Changes
Average Difference (GIIPS-East Asia)
Table 4: T-Tests of Means: Absorption Indicators
GIIPS versus East Asia in Crisis Event Time
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Table 5: Changes in the Structural Fiscal Balance and Real GDP Growth
Lagged Structural 
Balance (Δ) 0.312*** 0.394*** 1.576* 0.007 -0.367*** -0.295***
(3.22) (4.23) (1.98) (0.01) (3.76) (2.91)
Lagged GDP Growth 0.397*** 1.115*** -0.111*
(3.51) (5.61) (1.85)
Constant 2.782*** 1.809*** -1.082 -4.225*** 0.632*** 0.568***
(23.49) (6.06) (1.33) (5.84) (3.44) (3.16)
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.62 0.49 0.02 0.06
N 90 90 30 30 45 45
Lagged Structural 
Balance (Δ) 0.262 0.217 1.562** 0.987* -0.309* -0.302*
(-1.67) (1.24) (3.15) (2.62) (2.18) (2.00)
Lagged GDP Growth -0.139 0.487* -0.054
-0.61 (2.69) -0.32
Constant 3.062*** 3.455*** 0.385 -1.273 -1.218** -1.325**
(16.27) (5.17) (0.39) -1.45 (3.19) (2.53)
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 -0.11 0.35 0.75 0.02 -0.13
N 30 30 10 10 15 15
Lagged Structural 
Balance (Δ) -0.445 -0.465 -8.119** -1.62 -0.351 -0.305
(1.41) (1.55) (3.04) (1.04) (1.03) (0.9)
Lagged GDP Growth 0.419** -0.861*** 0.156
(2.15) (6.30) (1.33)
Constant 7.467*** 4.234*** 3.039** 2.792*** 5.935*** 5.049***
(26.34) (2.77) (2.30) (4.86) (23.21) (7.09)
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 -0.1 0.04 0.8 0.13 -0.11
N 49 49 20 20 80 80
 0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01
2002-2007 2008-2009 2010-2012
1992-1997 1998-1999 2000-2007
Panel C: Asia 10
2002-2007 2008-2009 2010-2012
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
Panel A: European 15
Panel B: GIIPS
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(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real GDP 
Growth
(Pre-crisis)
Post-Crisis Dummy -2.557*** -8.923*** -1.613**
(5.18) (9.62) (2.51)
Investment Ratio 0.263*** 0.106** 0.103* 0.267***
(0.046) (2.24) (1.68) (3.05)
Constant 7.309*** 34.989*** -2.382 3.606** 3.72* -2.202
(22.40) (57.06) -1.446 (2.14) (1.72) -0.96
26.87 92.62 33 16.39 2.82 9.32
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.41 0.18 0.18 0.02 0.09
N 128 128 132 128 72 56
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p <0.01
Real GDP 
Growth    
(Full Sample)
Real GDP 
Growth       
(Post-Crisis)
Table 6: The Impact of the East Asian Crisis on Real GDP Growth Rates and Investment Ratios (1980-2012)
Real GDP 
Growth     
(Full Sample)
Investment 
Ratio              
(Full Sample)
Real GDP 
Growth                
(Full Sample)
 
Appendix Table 1: Variable definitions
Variable
General government gross debt (% of GDP) General government gross debt World Economic Outlook (April 2013)
Government Overal Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) General government primary net lending/borrowing World Economic Outlook (April 2013)
Government primary fiscal balance  (% of GDP) General government net lending/borrowing World Economic Outlook (April 2013)
Government Structural Balance (% of Potential GDP) General government structural balance World Economic Outlook (April 2013)
General Government Revenues (% of GDP) General government revenue World Economic Outlook (April 2013)
General Government Expenditure (% of GDP) General government total expenditure World Economic Outlook (April 2013)
Real GDP Growth (percent) Gross domestic product, constant prices World Economic Outlook (April 2013)
Unemployment Rate (percent ) Unemployment rate (Percent of total labor force) World Economic Outlook (April 2013)
Consumption Ratio (% of GDP) Household Final Consumption Expenditure International Financial Statistics
Investment Ratio (% of GDP) Total investment World Economic Outlook (April 2013)
Gross Savings Rate (% of GDP ) Gross national savings World Economic Outlook (April 2013)
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) Current account balance World Economic Outlook (April 2013)
Labor Producitivity Hourly labor productivity, total economy index (2005==100) Eurostat dataset
Unit Labor Costs Unit labor costs, total economy index (2005=100), Eurostat dataset
Nominal Exchange Rate Nominal effective exchange rate index (2005=100) International Financial Statistics
Inflation (%) Consumer Prices, All Items (2005=100) International Financial Statistics
Interest Rate (%) Interest rate, government securities, government bonds International Financial Statistics
Definition Data Source
 
 
Appendix Table 2: Panel A 
  IMF Target WEO IMF Target WEO 
  Original  Revised  Actual  Original  Revised  Actual  
Percent of GDP Indonesia   
  1997/98      1997/98 1997 1998/99 1998/99 1998 
          
Change in fiscal balance –0.9 –2.2 -2.41 0.2 –9.2 -1.04 
Fiscal balance (levels) 0.3 –0.9 -1.25 0.5 –10.1 -2.29 
          
Change due to economic 
environment –1.3 –4.2   0.3 –11.1   
Exchange rate –1.4 –3.5   0.2 –6.4   
GDP growth 0.3 –0.5   0.1 –4.0   
Oil Price Change –0.2 –0.2   0 –0.7   
          
Policy changes 0.3 2.7   0.2 1.7   
Outlays 0.2 2.7   0.4 3.8   
Social Safety Net 0 0   0 –1.0   
Bank Restructuring –0.5 0   0 –1.6   
Statutory Revenue Change 0.6 0   –0.2 0.5   
Residual (unexplained) 0.2 0.7   –0.2 0.2   
Real GDP Growth rate 5 4.6 4.7 3 –12.1 -13.13 
Sources: WEO October 
2012, Lane et. al (1999)             
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Appendix Table 2: Panel B 
  IMF Target WEO IMF Target WEO 
  Original  Revised  Actual  Original  Revised  Actual  
Percent of GDP Korea   
  1997 1997 1997 1998 1998 1998 
          
Change in fiscal balance . –0.3 0.03 0.2 –5.0 -1.35 
Fiscal balance (levels) 0 0 2.56 0.2 –5.0 1.21 
          
Change due to economic 
environment . .   –0.4 –1.9   
Exchange rate . .   –0.3 –0.9   
GDP growth . .   –0.1 –1.0   
Oil Price Change         
          
Policy changes . .   –0.1 –2.8   
Outlays . .   0.1 –1.1   
Social Safety Net . .   –0.2 –2.1   
Bank Restructuring . .   –0.8 –1.4   
Statutory Revenue Change . .   0.8 1.8   
Residual (unexplained) . .   0.7 –0.4   
Real GDP Growth rate  5.5  5.77 2.5 –7.0 -5.71  
Sources: WEO October 2012, Lane 
et. al (1999)             
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Appendix Table 2: Panel C 
  IMF Target WEO IMF Target WEO 
  Original  Revised  Actual  Original  Revised  Actual  
Percent of GDP Thailand   
  1996/97 1996/97 1997 1997/98 1997/98 1998 
          
Change in fiscal balance –3.3 –4.0 -4.43 1.0 –3.5 -4.61 
Fiscal balance (levels) –1.1 –1.6 -1.68 –0.1 –5.1 -6.29 
          
Change due to economic 
environment –1.1 –0.3   –0.9 –3.1   
Exchange rate –0.2 –0.2   –0.9 –2.0   
GDP growth –1.0 –0.1   0 –0.9   
Oil Price Change         
          
Policy changes –1.2 –2.6   1.9 –0.6   
Outlays –0.6 –1.9   1.8 2.6   
Social Safety Net –0.6 0   0 –0.6   
Bank Restructuring 0 –0.7   –1.1 –2.0   
Statutory Revenue Change 0 0   1.2 –0.7   
Residual (unexplained) –1.0 –1.1   0 0.1   
Real GDP Growth rate 2.5 –0.4 -1.37 3.5 –5.0 -10.51 
Sources: WEO October 2012, Lane 
et. al (1999)             
Appendix 3: Crisis Timeline in the European Periphery and East Asia 
 
Greece 
10/19/2009- Socialist government reveals that Greece has been greatly under reporting their debt 
level, doubling the estimate of the previous government to 12% of GDP 
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/09/greek-debt-crisis-timeline). 
12/14/2009- Greece announces plans to reduce deficit by 4% in next year and pledges to bring 
the deficit to 3% by the end of the 4 year term        
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/14/greece-unveils-reforms-to-public-finances). 
3/4/2010- Greece announces austerity plan, increase in VAT and cigarette/alcohol tax as well as 
freeze on pensions and cap on civil service pay       
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/09/greek-debt-crisis-timeline). 
5/1/2010- Greece implements austerity budget in order to receive loan package 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/car050210a.htm). 
7/7/2010- Greek parliament passes pension reform as required by IMF/EU deal and raises 
women's retirement age to 65                                                  
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/09/greek-debt-crisis-timeline). 
6/29/2011- Greek parliament passes second austerity bill cutting spending and increasing taxes 
as required by EU loan program        
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/09/greek-debt-crisis-timeline). 
12/14/2011- IMF says Greek reforms are running behind schedule 
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/09/greek-debt-crisis-timeline). 
6/24/2011- European leaders agree to new loan program for Greece in return for Euro 28bn in 
cuts and tax raises plus a Euro 50bn privatization program 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/24/greece-eu-bailout-david-cameron). 
9/11/2011- Greece announces property tax increases to stave off the denial of a new round of 
loans (http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/sep/11/greece-emergency-property-tax). 
9/21/2011- Greece announces further austerity measures in response to demands from the Troika 
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/sep/21/greece-to-cut-more-jobs-and-spending). 
1/28/2012- German government insists more on more austerity measures as precondition for 
continuing loans to Greece                                       
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/09/greek-debt-crisis-timeline). 
2/12/2012- Greece announces further austerity plans in order to receive another round of loans 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/12/greece-austerity-cuts-euro-bailout). 
7/24/2012- Troika officials claim that Greece's austerity measures have not been carried out 
under good faith continued pressure by lending countries to implement austerity in debtor 
countries (http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/24/greek-exit-from-euro-fears-
heighten). 
9/19/2012- Greece begins plans to sell off public property to shrink deficit 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/19/debt-ridden-greece-firesale). 
 
 1 
Spain 
2/5/2010- Spain plans to cut deficit to 3% by 2013 to qualm market fears that it is the next 
Greece (http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/feb/05/spain-bid-calm-turmoil). 
9/30/2010- Moody cuts Spain's government debt rating citing concerns about government debt 
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/sep/30/spain-loses-top-credit-rating). 
8/26/2011- Spanish Government announces it will add Balanced Budget Amendment to 
Constitution with cap of 60% on public debts except in cases of emergency          
(http://www.businessinsider.com/spain-balanced-budget-amendment-2011-8#ixzz1b4rERjoW). 
12/19/2011- Spain's new government pledges public spending cuts of at least Euro 16.5bn 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/19/spain-prime-minister-spending-cuts). 
3/25/2012- Spain's PM announces new budget with Euro 40bn in spending cuts and taxes 
increase (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/25/eurozone-spain-cuts-mariano-rajoy). 
7/11/2012- Spain announces a new round of austerity measures totaling Euro 65bn as a 
precondition of receiving a new round of loan program   
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/11/mariano-rajoy-spain-65bn-cuts). 
 
 
Portugal 
4/28/2010- In the face of further trouble in Greece and a Spanish debt downgrade, Portugal 
announces austerity measures           
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/apr/28/greek-debt-crisis-europe-bailout). 
 
 
Ireland 
11/4/2010- Ireland announces plans to cut Euro 6bn from upcoming budget, double what had 
been predicted, includes cuts in social welfare, increases in petrol duties and increases in income 
taxes coupled with decreases in tax credits                      
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/04/ireland-slashes-budget-greek-bailout-fears). 
11/29/2010- Ireland announces 4 year austerity plan in order to receive loan program from EU, 
IMF, UK, Denmark and Sweden 
(http://money.cnn.com/2010/11/28/news/international/ireland_bailout/index.htm). 
12/5/2011- Ireland announces austerity measures along with Greece and Italy 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/05/cuts-tax-rises-ireland-italy). 
12/5/2012- Ireland implements a further Euro 2.5bn austerity plan mainly with new property tax 
and cut in child benefits              
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/05/ireland-austerity-budget). 
 
Italy 
9/14/2011- Italy votes to adopt a Euro 54bn austerity plan with aims to eliminate fiscal deficit by 
2013, details include cutting spending, delaying public pension payouts, raising VAT and 
implementing a new wealth tax                   
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/blog/2011/sep/14/french-banks-downgraded-europe-debt-
crisis). 
12/4/2011- Italy announces another austerity plan with taxes increases and spending cuts totaling 
Euro 30bn                  
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/04/austerity-italy-minister-tears). 
 2 
General European Union 
7/21/2011- European Council agrees to increase fiscal consolidation in Euro Area, member states 
(except those under a loan program) are required to reduce their deficits below 3% by 2013 
(http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/a-common-response-to-the-
crisis-situation.aspx?lang=en). 
12/9/2011- EC (with UK not joining) agree on intergovernmental treaty to place strict caps on 
government spending and borrowing with penalties for violators, will take effect Jan 1 2013 if 12 
members have approved the treaty                    
(http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/09/eurozone-idUSL5E7N900120111209). 
5/11/2012- EC announces new outlook for Eurozone further austerity measures are 
recommended to keep members in compliance with 3% deficit limit previously laid out 
(http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/may/11/more-austerity-unemployment-europe). 
 
 
East Asian Crisis IMF program date announcements 
 
Thailand: 
8/1997- IMF approves financial aid package 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm#box1)  
 
Indonesia:  
11/1997- IMF announces financial aid package 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/op178/op178.pdf Box 1.2 page 4) 
 
South Korea: 
12/1997- IMF announces 3 year financial program 
((http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/op178/op178.pdf Box 1.3 page 6) 
 
Malaysia: 
No program implemented by the IMF 
 
